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Abstract: When the concept of ‘skill’ is used in reading and writing research or more generally in linguis-
tic research, it is rarely made the subject of detailed and precise definitions or reflections. The present 
article is a theoretical contribution that consists mainly in reflections on the type of phenomenon that 
‘skill’ represents. Philosophically, the account is based above all on Aristotle’s views, according to which 
‘skill’ is characterised as a potentiality. Psychologically, this article expresses the opinion that the only 
way to describe, understand and explain ‘skill’ is by combining behaviourism and cognitivism. 
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1. CHALLENGES 
1.0 Background and goals 
1.1 Behaviourism and cognitive psychology have been two of the most influential 
schools in psychology in the past 40 or 50 years. In many ways they have been polar 
opposites and mutually exclusive. As an introduction I will examine the conse-
quences of employing these disparate schools strictly and consistently. (In practice, 
researchers usually do not do this; most research being done mixes in some of the 
notions from the other camp. But this type of eclecticism is often more problematic 
than ‘pure’ models. Here I have chosen to use pure models primarily to make my 
line of argument easier to follow.) The reflections presented below have emerged 
from my work in reading research, but I would contend that they are also relevant to 
a number of other fields of research within psychology, education and linguistics.
  
1.2 The aims of this article are (1) to focus on the fundamental problems of reading 
research; (2) to problematise the dominant position achieved by cognitive psycholo-
gy in reading research; and (3) to call attention to the fact that the concept of ‘skill’ 
needs to be more closely defined and assigned a more prominent position in reading 
research. I will try to determine the philosophical status of ‘skill’ and try to define 
‘skill’ by combining key concepts from both cognitive psychology and behaviour-
ism. 
2. PROBLEMS  
2.0 Behaviourism ad absurdum  
2.1 Behaviourism deals exclusively with observable behaviour (Watson, 1930). It is 
useful for describing associations between observed stimuli and observed responses 
in humans and in animals. It cannot, however, explain the messy deviations in our 
behaviour that are the result of our cognition or will. Moreover, this school of psy-
chology cannot describe, much less explain, ‘inner’ phenomena such as doing sums 
in your head. If we exclusively base our science on observed behaviour, we will 
have to admit that there is quite a gap between the task someone is to perform and 
the solution he or she finds. For example: A voter in an election has to decide 
whether or not the promises the various candidates give during their campaigns are 
believable or not. Basing his or her vote on the candidates’ observable behaviour 
alone would not be wise. A psychology that excludes non-observable entities such 
as thoughts and feelings will be a vastly limited science.  
2.2 The principle of association between stimulus and response is fundamental to 
behaviourism’s theory of learning. To create strong and lasting associations, repeti-
tion is necessary. The term ‘overlearning’ is used for when we continue with repeti-
tions past the point when stable associations are established. Behaviouristic theories 
of learning do not traffic in notions such as ‘understanding’ (Leahey, 2001). 
2.3 Heartbeats and breathing are for the most part automatised (that is, they take 
place without learning, but we can learn to regulate them somewhat). The term ‘hab-
it’ is used for actions we learn to perform. Habits are basic elements in behaviour-
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ism. But we should also note that habits can be affected consciously; we can change 
them by intellect and will. From this we may conclude that behaviourism alone is 
not sufficient for explaining all psychological phenomena.   
  
3.0 Cognitivism ad absurdum 
3.1 In cognitive psychology all attention is directed towards the ‘inner’ life (von 
Eckardt, 1993; Gardner, 1985). Traditionally this school focuses on ‘thought’ and 
‘awareness’. These terms, however, are unclear. Nor is it clear how thoughts, being 
very subjective things, can be studied. What are the ‘causes’ of our thoughts? 
3.2 Behaviourism, as mentioned, uses overlearning in order to secure the best possi-
ble learning. For example, overlearning is a technique often used with dyslexics. 
Despite the fact that some cognitive psychologists and educators use this technique, 
it must be pointed out that this concept has no basis in their theory of learning; it 
belongs in the school of behaviourism. A pure cognitivist would have to employ 
cognitive techniques in working with dyslexics. The cognitive solution to dyslexia is 
cognition of cognition: metacognition (Gombert, 1992).  
3.3 Metacognition makes great demands on intellectual ability and awareness – even 
for people without learning difficulties. An example: There is a widespread consen-
sus that dyslexics have difficulties identifying and distinguishing phonemes. They 
thus also have difficulty forming correct associations between phonemes and graph-
emes. However, explaining this to dyslexics using metacognition is no easy task. In 
fact, it is somewhat akin to using intellectual reasoning to explain to a colour-blind 
person what colours are. Moreover, there is a question as to what is meant by this 
‘metacognition’ (and by similar expressions such as ‘awareness of awareness’). A 
subject cannot simultaneously be an object. An eye cannot see itself. Metacognition, 
as it is currently conceived, cannot be studied scientifically, nor can it be taught.  
3.4 Assuring the quality of one’s metacognition would require meta-metacognition. 
Assuring the quality of that would require meta-meta-metacognition – and so on, in 
an infinite sequence of ever more ‘metas’. 
3.5 In the real world there are no thoughts that are entirely unaffected by feelings, 
urges and sudden insights. This is an important reason for why a pure cognitivism is 
indefensible. Another problem with pure cognitivism is its inability to explain why 
we ‘choose’ one thought over another. The history of science shows that new ideas 
or discoveries often are arrived at by irrational routes (Kuhn, 1962). This can only 
be explained by granting some efficacy to feelings, urges and sudden insights. The 
same is true when we try to explain mistakes in reasoning and learning difficulties. 
3.6 The problems involved with using the concept of metacognition to explain how 
the mind works do not collide with the obvious fact that we do monitor our own 
mental activities. Even if we cannot observe our mental activities while they are 
taking place, we can observe their results. Aquinas claims that ‘the soul is known by 
its acts. For a man perceives that he has a soul and lives and exists by the fact that he 
perceives that he senses and understands and performs other vital operations of this 
kind […] No one perceives that he understands except through the fact that he un-
derstands something, for to understand something is prior to understanding that one 
understands.’ (De veritate, 10, 8, Thomas Aquinas).  
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3.7 Cognitive psychology has often employed flow charts that illustrate the ‘normal’ 
paths followed in solving cognitive problems (Reber, 1985). The dual-route model 
of reading is an example (Coltheart, 2005). There has been disagreement about the 
usefulness of this model for describing, understanding and explaining ‘normal’ read-
ing and reading difficulties; cf., e.g., Coltheart, 2006). Is this model best conceived 
of as a ‘summary’ of how people read? Is it a hypothesis about what happens at the 
neurological level or at the psychological level? Perhaps the most obvious way of 
understanding this model is to view it as a description of what is meant by ‘reading’; 
that is, as a definition – more precisely, a normative definition that points out the 
necessary components of adequate reading. In such definitions there are more or less 
explicit conditions on what is ‘normal’ or effective reading. To the extent that these 
conditions are correct, ‘flow charts’ with their different ‘boxes’ may show us, for 
example, what ‘subtasks’ create problems for dyslexics. In this way they may con-
tribute to a more precise diagnosis of dyslexia. Flow charts, however, do not give an 
overview of the causes behind the putative fact that reading takes place in a particu-
lar way. Nor do they give us any explanation as to how or why a particular instance 
of a person’s reading is influenced by the situation or trial conditions. It should also 
be noted that flow charts do not give explanations as to how reading ability is devel-
oped. Therefore they do not tell us how to help poor readers. We have to know 
something about feelings, urges, habits, environmental factors and the like in order 
to understand how and why individual variations in reading ability (and in particular 
instances of reading) occur. Neurology, behaviourism and connectionism will pro-
vide more insight here than cognitive psychology. 
3. SOLUTIONS 
 4.0 A realistic psychology 
4.1 It must be concluded that pure behaviourism and pure cognitivism both lead to 
unreasonable consequences. An eclectic mix of the two is equally problematic. In 
the real world, body and mind make up a unified whole – but not a mixture. It is not 
so much the case that we have a body and a mind, but that we are both body and 
mind.  
4.2 Models that simply assume an interaction between the biological/neurological 
substrate and cognition are riddled with the same problems that Descartes’ dualism 
faced (cf., e.g., Frith & Blakemore, 2005).  
4.3 The best hypotheses in this area are those developed by connectionism. Connec-
tionism assumes as a starting point that there is no essential difference between the 
cognitive level and the neurological/biological level (Bechtel & Abrahamson, 1991).  
4.4 One objection to connectionism, however, is that it hides the differences be-
tween the ‘outer’ and the ‘inner’ of mental acts. Ludwig Wittgenstein claimed that 
‘the human body is the best picture of the human soul […]’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, II, 
iv, 178). He argued that (1) we have a consciousness that cannot be observed by 
others; and (2) mental activity cannot be taken as the cause of observable behaviour. 
He claimed, for example, that when you see someone ‘break out in joy’, their ob-
servable behaviour is a criterion or a hallmark of their inner joyful feeling. (Witt-
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genstein, 1953, §580). This is to say that both the mental and the physical aspects 
are part of the definition of ‘joy’. A metaphor for this would be a mountain-top with 
two sides. Neither side can be said to cause the other. When we have seen both sides 
of the mountain, we can identify it more precisely and confidently than if we had 
only seen one side of it. Even if a mountain-top has several sides, we may use only 
one name for referring to the top. Similarly, the single term ‘man’ may refer to both 
an outer and an inner ‘side’. Brain-imaging and other studies have given us much 
new knowledge about the brain, but the relationship between the mind and the brain 
as well as the definitions of, say, ‘skills’ or ‘intelligence’ are primarily philosophical 
problems and tasks that cannot be solved by means of brain imaging; cf., e.g., Brook 
& Mandik (2004). 
4.5 Letting this notion of a mountain-top inform our thinking further, we can say 
that the relationship between the mental and the physical aspects of something, that 
is, between the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ aspects of it, is like the relationship between a 
conceptual definition and an operational definition. The notion of ‘intelligence’, for 
example, can be operationalised by defining it as the score achieved on a certain test. 
Yet according to this way of thinking, we cannot say that the subject’s intelligence 
caused him or her to achieve that score. It is often claimed that an operational defini-
tion is logically deduced from a conceptual definition. But it is not possible to de-
duce outer, physical manifestations from inner, mental activity. Rather, these phe-
nomena are complementary; they shed light upon each other. In order to understand 
what is meant by, for example, ‘reading’, it is necessary to take into consideration 
both the outer, physical aspects and the inner, mental ones. Only when the phenom-
enon ‘reading’ is determined in both perspectives can we begin to look at causal 
relationships.   
  
5.0 What are skills? 
5.1 Just as a human being is a unique combination of mind and body, both of these 
aspects are reflected in the term ‘skill’. In order to understand this term, we do well 
to look to Aristotle’s philosophy. On the one hand, Aristotle disagreed with the ma-
terialists and the determinists, who claimed that all of our actions are the product of 
inherited factors and the pressures of the environment (nature and nurture). On the 
other hand, he rejected the claims of Socrates and Plato that as long as we think cor-
rectly, we will also act correctly. For them, a true philosopher is one who has clear 
and true thoughts; as such, he will also be a morally good person. Aristotle consid-
ered that Socrates and Plato put too much store in the power of thought in daily life. 
He held that intelligence and knowledge alone were not sufficient to lead a person to 
act in accordance with moral norms. In the real world, our actions are often some-
what ‘distorted’ by feelings and bad influences. We need therefore to practice ‘act-
ing good’ – but not as a ‘mechanical’ habit. On the contrary: we need to both follow 
general rules and at the same time take into consideration that which is unique in 
each situation. We acquire an attitude or disposition and thereby become virtuous 
(cf. Thomas Aquinas’ (2006) distinctions between ‘potentiae’ and ‘habitus’ in Sum-
ma Theologiae, vol. 22, Ia2ae. 49–54). 
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5.2 Regarding the acquisition of skills, Aristotle writes: ‘of all the things that come 
to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is 
plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we 
got the senses, but on the contrary, we had them before we used them, and did not 
come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, 
as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before 
we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and 
lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate 
by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.’ (Artistotle, 1934, 1103a26–
1103b2). To this it should be added that skills are not unchangeable, even though 
they are more stable than the particular instances of their being performed. There is 
always the possibility that they will improve or degenerate. 
5.3 In the language of today – and with the greatest possibility for empirical meas-
urement – we can say that skills are combinations of automaticity and awareness 
(i.e. conscious monitoring and possible correction in the performance of the task). 
There are varying degrees of automatising and conscious monitoring. The combina-
tion of these two ways of performing tasks will vary according to the type of task 
being performed, the purpose of the task, etc. Developing a skill entails developing 
an automatisation, the ability to consciously monitor one’s performance, and the 
ability to combine these in productive ways. 
5.4 We can have a great deal of knowledge about the physical laws pertaining to 
how bodies float on water but still not be able to swim. Aristotle’s dictum on prac-
tice is valid here. Bicycling is another skill that is developed through practice. A 
high degree of automatisation is necessary. If you think too much about the whys 
and hows of balancing on two wheels, you will fall. But if you bicycle too much on 
autopilot, you will not be able to tackle unexpected situations in a flexible manner. 
We cannot say, however, that a skill is awareness + automaticity. Rather, it is the 
most situationally appropriate combination thereof. These two aspects form a uni-
fied whole – just as mind and body are a unified whole. A tightrope-walker, for ex-
ample, is not a person who in addition to performing certain movements on a tight-
rope also has a certain awareness of these actions. As mentioned, both the ‘inner’ 
(mental) and the ‘outer’ (physical) aspects of a skill are part of the definition of that 
skill. Therefore, when cognitive psychology puts much weight on identifying and 
performing ‘sub-skills’, this may create more problems than it solves. From a logical 
point of view it may be clarifying to split reading into its smallest, atomary units. 
From a psychological and educational point of view, by contrast, it may be extreme-
ly challenging. Some people will find the subject too abstract. Others will find it 
difficult to shift in a natural way between parts and the whole – as it were, between 
the trees and the wood. 
5.5 It is important to note that the relationship among sub-skills is definitory, that is, 
logical and not empirical. We can illustrate this with the following example: (a) a 
judge is a person who, on behalf of the state and in accordance with the law, pro-
nounces verdicts in court cases; and (b) there are a number of laws and rules that 
define what tasks this entails in practice. We can say that (a) is equivalent to the 
skill, while (b) is equivalent to sub-skills. Both (a) and (b) are parts of the definition 
of ‘judge’. The question of how the judge ought to, say, treat the prosecutor and the 
 WHAT ARE SKILLS? 155 
defence counsel cannot be answered empirically, by looking at how judges actually 
perform. The answer must be found in the definitions and rules regulating the 
judge’s activities. Similarly, it is a commonplace to define ‘reading’ as a skill which 
includes sub-skills such as comprehension and phonological analysis and synthesis. 
If we lay down categorical definitions of concepts such as ‘reading’ or ‘dyslexia’, 
we thereby exclude them from empirical research and insulate them from change. In 
my opinion, all definitions must be perceived and treated as hypotheses in need of 
adjustment as and when empirical research so requires (cf. Tønnessen, 1997). 
5.6 In addition to reading, important examples of skills are intelligence and language 
skills. Often skills are conceived of and referred to as if they were delimited and 
localised entities (e.g., in Jerry Fodor’s modular theory of mind: Fodor, 1983). Hy-
postatising or substantiating in this manner is misleading. Just as the fragility of a 
glass surface is both nowhere to be found in the glass itself and everywhere in it, we 
cannot localise skills. Even though you are in Norway, it makes no sense to conceive 
of your reading ability as also being in Norway … However, we can describe the 
conditions necessary for reading, such as awareness, certain linguistic skills, vision, 
etc.    
5.7 We need to be clear about the difference between ‘skill’ and the ‘performance’ 
or actualisation of a skill. Even though a skill changes over time, it is still more sta-
ble than the actualisations of it. This is important to take into consideration when 
diagnosing and treating reading disabilities. Actual instances of reading are highly 
influenced by motivation, concentration, the reading situation and the like. To the 
extent that a person’s reading difficulties are due to such circumstances, efforts 
should be made to improve them. Doing so will usually be easier than trying to im-
prove the skill itself. 
 
6.0 How do we learn skills? 
6.1 The expression ‘tacit knowledge’ is often associated with Michael Polanyi 
(1973). He expressed his basic point in the sentence: ‘We know more than we can 
tell.’ We see this clearly in practical skills such as swimming, bicycling and the like. 
We are not able to acquire these skills through reading or hearing about them, and 
we cannot explain them fully to another person with words alone. This is not be-
cause of any lack of verbal ability; it is because these skills are not about 
‘knowledge’ in the usual sense (cf. Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.1212: ‘What can be 
shown, cannot be said.’). They are ‘knowing how’, not ‘knowing that’. Another 
term for ‘knowing how’ is ‘procedural knowledge’ – or ‘tacit knowledge’. Proce-
dural or tacit knowledge is not about following rules. It is more apt to say that the 
activity in question is in accordance with rules, not that the person exhibiting the 
skill is following rules intentionally and fully consciously. Often we can only claim 
that there is a regularity or pattern in the activity. 
6.2 Even though we cannot describe precisely the regularity or patterns in a complex 
activity (such as swimming or riding a bicycle), our consciousness can nonetheless 
be trained to monitor these activities and take over control of them in some circum-
stances. Control and correction such as this makes the difference between, say, a 
good and a poor pianist. This is typical of all kinds of skills.  
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6.3 Even though skills cannot be learned through theoretical teaching alone, not all 
such teaching is worthless. Learning through examples – seeing the behaviour mod-
elled – is also important. Skills are primarily acquired through ‘implicit learning’ 
and practice (Reber, 1993).  
 
7.0 Potentiality and language 
7.1 Like other skills, language skill is a kind of potentiality. For example, when we 
are asleep, our entire language skill exists only as a potentiality. When we are 
awake, we may use parts of it while other parts exist only as potentialities. Moreo-
ver, language is primarily a skill, not a system as claimed by Chomsky (1957; 2006) 
and others. Language can only be studied through speech acts – as realisations of 
language skills. By means of empirical methods we may find regularities and pat-
terns in language performance at various times and places. We cannot, however, use 
the term ’system’ in the same meaning as it has in relation to, say, carefully con-
structed philosophical systems. Regularities and patterns in language performance 
are subject to continuous change. Grammar as a scientific discipline consists of em-
pirically based generalisations with limited scope. Politicians, authors, teachers and 
others may use those generalisations to formulate normative recommendations about 
how to use language in order to obtain specific goals when it comes to expressing 
thoughts and feelings, but it must be questioned to what extent such recommenda-
tions can be seen as empirically based. 
7.2 The concept of ‘potentiality’ is also necessary in defining linguistic meaning. 
Plato claimed that concepts or ideas were located in an unchanging ‘realm of ideas’. 
According to this way of thinking, we label a person a ‘human’ because he or she 
exhibits characteristics that are in accord with the unchanging definition. During the 
Middle Ages this notion of ‘conceptual realism’ was criticised by the ‘nominalists’, 
who claimed that only particular instances existed. Both ways of looking at things 
reduce potentiality to actuality – to either abstract ideas or concrete (spoken or writ-
ten) words.  
7.3 An alternative solution is to look at words as variables. In mathematics, a varia-
ble is something that has a value within a certain range. For example, we can say 
that x is a variable within the range of whole numbers from 5 to 11. The seven num-
bers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 then form a set. At any one time, x can have only one of 
these values (thus, in a sense, the nominalists are correct). But it must be added that 
x can potentially have any of the seven values. By adding the notion of ‘potentiality’ 
we assume a middle stance between the conceptual realists and the nominalists. We 
can illustrate this point by using the word ‘man’ as an example. Among the potential 
meanings of this word we find: (a) ‘an adult male human being’, (b) ‘a human being 
of either sex’, (c) ‘the human race’ and (d) ‘a husband’. The word potentially has all 
these – and other – meanings, but it has only one meaning at a time. It should also be 
added that grammatical moods are one part of the potentials of meaning. The word 
‘help’ may for example be used in an indicative mood (‘Paul needs help.’), in an 
imperative mood (‘Help!’) or as a question (‘Does Paul need help?’). The possible 
meanings (and moods) taken together delimit the range of the word – just like a giv-
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en set of numbers delimits the possible values of a variable. Contexts, situations, 
persons, etc., determine which of the potential meanings is actualised. 
7.4 Empirical studies are necessary to delimit these fields of meaning. Meaning is a 
potential that signs (codes, symbols, etc.) ‘have’. How this potential is realised de-
pends on the person, intention, situation, etc. Empirical investigation must be based 
on physical reactions elicited by speech acts, and on interpretations of those reac-
tions. The goal of empirical investigations is to obtain descriptions, definitions, ex-
planations and understanding. As mentioned above, meaning involves both ‘outer’ 
and ‘inner’ aspects. Based on investigations of reactions we may formulate hypothe-
ses of meaning, although we will never attain exhaustive and unchangeable defini-
tions. There are usually several sets of possible realisations of potentials for mean-
ing. These, however, are not as clearly defined as in mathematics. They are more 
like magnetic fields, where at the centre we find the most common meanings. A 
field of possible meanings can also change over time and place. In studies of the 
type referred to here it is not useful to draw sharp lines between semantics, pragmat-
ics and hermeneutics. A certain meaning cannot be localised to a certain element in 
the overall linguistic code or string of signs, nor to the non-linguistic context. At-
tempting to localise exactly where the meaning arises in, say, a poem or other ‘mes-
sage’ is as impossible as localising where the fragility of a glass surface ‘is’: it is 
everywhere and nowhere.  
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